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Abstract
Urban road pricing schemes have been designed in order to reduce externalities generated by traffic. Main impacts regard: time
loss due to congestion, local pollution, noise, contribution to climate change caused by emissions of GHGs, pavement costs and 
road damages, increase in accidents risks, extra-fuel consumption, decrease in quality of life. Moreover road pricing schemes 
generate public revenues.
The paper performs a comparative evaluation of the three main experiences of urban road pricing in Europe: London (in operations 
since 2003), Stockholm (in operations since 2007, after a period of trial in 2006) and Milan (in operations since 2008, with a shift 
from pollution to congestion charge in 2012). Since their launch, the schemes have been adjusted in terms of amount of charge, 
area of application and other features.
The schemes have been able to reduce negative externalities generated by traffic, such as accidents, congestion and emissions, up 
to different levels. A comparative analysis of the three schemes is provided. Determinants of differences in the effectiveness of the 
schemes are evaluated with a particular focus on elasticity of use of private vehicles to charge.
The results can be useful to design well targeted congestion charge schemes and to assess their efficacy.
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1. The ratio of urban road charging
Negative externalities generated by mobility have been studied by economists since the XIX century (Newbery, 
1998 and 1990). Main categories of externalities regard environmental impacts, accidents and congestion. 
Environmental impacts refer to local air quality degradation due to traffic emissions – causing health consequences, 
reduction of life expectancy, reduction of real estate values and damages to cultural heritage, noise – causing health 
consequences, stress and reduction of real estate values, contribution to global climate change through CO2 emissions.
Accidents involve material damages to vehicles and injuries and deaths to people.
Congestion is responsible for loss of time, economic productivity decrease, extra fuel consumption and frustration.
Externalities are particularly relevant in urban contexts, where there is a high density of people living, working and 
moving and a high relative scarcity of space (CE Delft, 2008).
Externalities can vary with respect to three main aspects: place where they are generated, time and type of vehicle 
(CE Delft, 2011) – Tab.1.
Mobility in dense, high populated and attractive areas, like city centres or main commuting roads, generates higher 
levels of congestion and other externalities than in scarcely populated and isolated areas.
Mobility in peak hours generates higher levels of congestion and other externalities than in daytime off-peak and 
night  hours.
Private motorized traffic generates higher emissions than public transportation (on per capita basis) and non-
motorized modes.  Trucks give a higher contribution to congestion than cars and motorbikes.
Table 1. Transport marginal extern costs in urban and non-urban areas in Europe in year 2008 (Euro/1.000 km) – our 
elaboration on CE Delft (2011).
Urban area Non urban area Difference
Car 87 44 49,4%
Motorbike 271 106 60,9%
Bus 44 24 45,5%
Train 19 12 36,8%
Road users impose (in different measure externalities to other road users)  and bear (in different measures) 
externalities from other road users. So mobility is characterized by reciprocal externalities and congestion can be 
considered a “club good” (McKinnon, Sharon, Browne, Whiteing, 2010). But road users also impose unilateral 
externalities to residents. Recent studies assess the relevance of health consequences on people resident in proximity 
of congestioned areas and roads (Invernizzi et al., 2011).
Externalities generated by mobility are not limited to environmental impacts, accidents and congestion and include 
pavement costs and road damages, loss of house values, decrease in quality of life, environmental and social impacts 
in the production of fuels and in the construction of road infrastructures, social effects of transport infrastructure 
barriers, like roads and rails (Delucchi, 2000; Danielis, 2001).
Estimates of externalities generated by mobility in urban areas vary depending on the specific factors described. 
An average estimation for European cities amounts to 55,4 euros/year per person (CE Delft, 2008).
Overall in European cities, the adverse impact of traffic resulting in air pollution, noise, greenhouse gas emissions, 
delays and traffic accidents causes an economic damage amounting to 100 billion € each year, corresponding to about 
1% of the EU’s GDP (European Commission, 2007; Erdmenger and Frey, 2010)
Externalities can be treated in various ways. Economics instruments have been proven particularly effective at this 
purpose. In the case of urban mobility, park pricing has been widely introduced in cities and road pricing schemes 
have been introduced in a limited number of cities.
As Gervasoni and Sartori (2007) put in evidence, different tolling schemes have been designed, with diverse goals 
and functioning mechanisms: Road Tolls, Value Pricing, High Occupancy Tolls, Travel distance based charging, 
Travel time based charging, Road Space Rationing, Cordon-based charging, Zonal schemes, Satellite-based road 
pricing schemes.
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Road charging has been experienced by a group of pioneer cities, starting from Singapore and, even if its diffusion 
is still limited, more and more cities are considering to adopt it1. The European Commission is pushing in this direction 
(European Commission, 2011 and 2013).
The aim, design of schemes, level of charges and results attained vary in factual experiences. The Curacao European 
funded project (Curacao, 2009) identifies several possible objectives of urban road user charging schemes: Congestion 
Relief; Environment; Revenue Growth; Economic growth; Health; Liveability; Safety; Equity/Social Inclusion; Future 
Generations.
Actual road pricing schemes charging private vehicles have been introduced by municipal authorities mainly in an 
attempt to price the externalities caused by traffic. 
These externalities, created by the fact that road users tend to disregard the impact they cause on others, lead to 
a gap between private costs, as faced by the decision maker, and social costs, as incurred by society at large, and they 
prevent the market to reach an efficient outcome. The introduction of a pricing scheme reduces these distortions and 
it hence results into a higher efficiency because journeys would then occur only when the benefits from driving 
outweigh the sum of the costs, which include all priced externalities (Newbery, 1988 and 1990).
Charges are not set at the efficient level that equals the marginal social damage, providing a full internalization of 
externalities, following pigouvian criteria (Pigou, 1920), mainly because of political reluctance and social acceptance 
difficulty in raising it up to over a certain level. Also the amount of charges is the same for all social groups (with the 
exception of exemptions and discounts for some categories) while a pigouvian approach would require differentiated 
charges depending on the damage caused.
In presence of a plurality of polluters and polluted, responsible and affected at different levels, efficiency can be 
achieved only if each polluter faces a personalized price that fully captures the harm generated. This means that when 
setting the toll both the cost curve and the demand curve of each actor should be known to the regulator. Unfortunately 
in a world of imperfect information such degree of differentiation is unachievable, and introducing a flat tax or a 
differentiated but not personalized tax, would never lead to the efficient market solution, leading to second-best 
solutions.
In this sense road charges are not a panacea: as the economic theory of “second best” suggests, they may cause 
distortions, as well as unwanted redistributive effects.
A relevant topic is the destination of revenues from charges. Road charging is often designed with a scope. In the 
case revenues are destined to road maintenance and improvement, there is a coincidence between payers and 
benefitters (as for toll bridges). In the case revenues are destined to improve public transit there is a subsidy from car 
drivers to users of public transport (implying a social choice to modify modal split).
So the assessment of road charging schemes requires a plurality of indicators, also targeted on the specific aims of 
the systems, as the Curacao project (2009) suggests. Curacao identifies the following main categories of indicators: 
Efficiency; Equity; Environment; Scheme Finances; Safety; Health; Liveability; Land Use. 
In some cases, depending on local specificities, a charge requires dynamic variations in order to maintain its 
impacts. The effects of charges can attenuate over time, either because drivers “get used to the charges” and hence do 
not react to them anymore (“acquaintance effect”), or because the freed-up road space will be filled up by new groups 
of drivers, returning the amount of congestion to the same levels as before the charges (“rebound effect”).
The paper performs a comparative evaluation of the three main experiences of urban road pricing in Europe: 
London, Stockholm and Milan.
2. London, Stockholm and Milan: a comparison of three European road charge schemes 
The three largest European urban road pricing systems started during a decade (first London in 2003, then 
Stockholm in 2006, finally Milan in 2008).
The three systems have some common as well as differentiated features, as shown in Tab. 2.
1 In some cities, like Edinburgh, Manchester and New York, the attempt by local governments to introduce a charge failed because of citizens 
or political opposition.
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Table 2. Urban road pricing comparison: London, Stockholm and Milan
London Stockholm Milan
M
ai
n 
fe
at
ur
es
 o
f 
th
e 
sc
he
m
es
Starting 
year
February 2003a January 2006 (7 months trial) 
Permanent from August 2007e
Pollution charge from  January 
2008
Congestion charge from January 
2012
(formally a trial until April 2013)i
Area 21 km2
(1.3% of the city surface) 
Western extension from February 
2007 to January 2011
Metropolitan area 14 m inhab.a
30km²
(16% of the city surface). 
Stockholm County 1.9 m inhab.e
8 km2
(4.5% of the city surface)
Metropolitan area 3 m inhab.i
Charge 
level 
£ 5
£ 8 from July 2005
£ 10 from January 2011 
£ 11.50 (about € 14.50) from June 
2014a
SEK 20 (about € 2.16) during peak 
periods (7:30-8:30, 16:00-17:30),
SEK 15 30 minutes before and 
after the peak periods and SEK 10 
during the rest of the period 6:30-
18:30. 
The total charge per day is capped 
at SEK 60.e
Pollution charge: proportional to 
vehicles’ emission class, of € 0, 2, 
5 or 10 per day.
Congestion charge: flat charge of € 
5 per dayi
Application 
of charge 
Cordon pricing
Daily fee
Pay for entrance, exit, intra-area 
tripsa
Cordon pricing
Single passage fee (with daily 
limit) 
Pay for entrance and exit of the 
areae
Cordon pricing
Daily fee
Pay for entrance in the areai
Time of 
application 
Weekdays, 7:00-18:00a Weekdays, 6:30-18:30e Weekdays, 7:30-19:30i
London Stockholm Milan
R
es
ul
ts
Reduction 
of whole 
traffic 
with respect 
to reference 
year 
-14% (2003)b, c
-16% (2006)b, c
-21% (2008)b, c
-21% (2006)f
-19% (2007)f
-18% (2008)f
-18% (2009)f
-19% (2010)f
-20% (2011)f
Ecopass:
-20.8% (2008)j
-17% (2009)j
-19.3% (2010) euro IV diesel 
chargedj
-10.8% (2011)j
Area C:
-38.5% (2012)j
-37.6% (2013)j
-36.8% (2014)j
Congestion 
reduction 
-30% (2003)b
-22% (2005)b
-8% (2006)b
0% (2007)b
Reduction 
of 
potentially 
chargeable 
traffic 
-33% (2003)c
-36% (2006)c
£8 charge drove to a 53% 
reduction of fully chargeable 
traffic in 2007c
After the first year (2008) Ecopass 
reduced chargeable passenger 
traffic on average by 60.5% and in 
the last year (2011) by 79.8% and 
63.2%, respectively for a € 2 and €
R
es
ul
ts
Modal shift Switch of car drivers to public 
transport  (about 10% increase of 
underground and bus passengers 
with destination inside the area)b.
99% of commuters renouncing to 
use car switched to public 
transportf
Switch of car drivers to public 
transport (about 12.5% increase of 
passengers exiting subway stations 
inside the area)j
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Accidents 
reduction in 
the area
9% reduction of accidents in the 
first year (2-5% additional 
reduction with respect to trend). 
n.a. 21.3% reduction of road accidents 
in 2011 with respect with 2007 
(pre-Ecopass)j
Emissions 
reduction in 
the area
-13% NOx, -15% PM10, -16% 
CO2 emissionsd
- 13% PM10, - 13% CO2 
emissionsg
-15% PM10 emissions in 2011 
with respect to pre-Ecopass.
Further - 18% reduction in 2012 
(first year application of Area C) 
with respect to 2011j
London Stockholm Milan
C
os
ts
 a
nd
 r
ev
en
ue
s
Set up 
investment 
160 m £
(203.5 m €)a
1,900 m SEK
(207.2 m €)e
7 m € (excluding sunk costs)i
Annual 
operating 
cost 
90 m £
(114.4 m €)a
220 m SEK
(23.9 m €)e
14 m €i
Gross 
revenues 
per year 
(excluding 
fines) 
from 138 m £ to 227 m £ in 2012
(from 175.5 m € to 288.6 m €  in 
2012)a
763 m SEK
(83.2 m €)e
from 12 m € in 2008 to 5.9 m € in 
2011 (Ecopass);
30 m € in 2012 (Area C)i
29.9 m € in 2013 (Area C –
provisional data)k
21.4 m € in 2014 (Area C –
provisional data)l
Ratio 
operating 
costs / 
revenues 
39%  (in 2008; falling from 
initially 65%)a
28%e,h Over 100% for Ecopass;
65% (increasing from initially 
46%) for Area Ci
London Stockholm Milan
E
la
st
ic
it
y
Elasticity 
values 
0.47b 0.70 in 2006 to 0.85 in 2009 
onwardsf
0.46 – 0.66 (for different classes of 
emissions of vehicles)m
Tab data sources:
a. http://tfl.gov.uk/modes/driving/congestion-charge j. AMAT (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)
b. Transport for London (2008) k. Comune di Milano (2014)
c. Transport for London (2008 b) l. Comune di Milano (2015)
d. TfL (2005) m. Croci and Ravazzi (2015)
e. http://www.stockholmsforsoket.se/
f. Börjesson M. et al. (2012)
g. Anas, Lindsey (2011)
h. Erdmenger and Frey (2010)
i. http://www.comune.milano.it/portale/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os_hAc8OgAE8TIwMDJ2MzAyMPIzdfHw8_
Y28jQ_1wkA6zeD9_o1A3E09DQwszV0MDIzMPEyefME8DdxdjiLwBDuBooO_nkZ-bql-QnZ3m6KioCADL1TNQ/dl2/
d1/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnB3LzZfQU01UlBJNDIwT1RTMzAySEtMVEs5TTMwMDA!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/
connect/ContentLibrary/elenco+siti+tematici/elenco+siti+tematici/area+c
All of them are cordon charges, where cameras automatically control access to central areas. The dimension of 
areas varies from 8 km2 in Milan, to 21 km2 in London (not considering the temporary western extension) to 30 km2
in Stockholm. 
London and Milan set daily entrance charges, allowing for unlimited entrances, exits and travels during the time of 
charge application. Stockholm, instead, adopted a “pay as you drive” tariff (modelled after Singapore) to be paid at 
every single crossing of the area, differentiated for the time. In Milan entrance crossings are considered, in Stockholm 
entrance and exit crossings are considered, while in London all trips (even inside the cordon) are considered.
Baselines are expressed in different variables. Before implementing a congestion charge system there were  about 
150.000 car trips in entrance to the charged area in Milan, 400.000 trips inside or entering the area in London and over 
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400.000 crossings (either in entrance or in exit) the area in Stockholm, during charging hours. In spite of the variety 
of indicators, traffic conditions in the area are comparable.
All charged areas are core areas for the cities and metropolitan areas and served by an extended and dense transit 
network.
The main aim for all systems is reducing congestion. A secondary aim is to reduce air pollution (this aim was 
prevalent in the first phase in Milan).
In all systems a flat rate is imposed: at present it amounts to £11,50 in London (€ 14,50), SEK 20 in Stockholm 
(€ 2) and € 5 in Milan. In the first phase in Milan charge was differentiated (€ 0, 2, 5 and 10) on the basis of PM10 
emission factors.
Charges are on daily basis in London and Milan and on number of accesses in Stockholm (with a daily maximum 
of SEK 60). In London circulation in the area is charged, while in Milan access to the area is charged and in Stockholm 
crossing of the area is charged.
Charges operate only in the daytime (11 hours a day in London, 12 hours a day in Stockholm and Milan).
All systems present several exemptions and reduced charges for specific typologies of vehicles (public transport, 
“clean vehicles”, residents). The exemption was lifted for “clean vehicles” in Stockholm. The majority of vehicles is 
exempt or charged at discount in London and Milan.
Similar technologies are in place, using cameras automatically recognizing car plates.
Stockholm and Milan started as trials and were then confirmed. All the systems evolved during time in various 
aspects like the area (London), the amount of charge (London and Milan), exemptions (London, Stockholm and Milan) 
and other aspects. In the case of Milan there was a major change in the structure of the scheme itself, shifting from a 
pollution charge to a congestion charge.
Political and public debate were relevant factors in setting up and decide permanency of the systems. In the cases 
of Stockholm and Milan a referendum was a key factor at that purpose.
In all cases, even when polls showed citizens were not in favour when the charge was announced, after 
implementation the majority of citizens turned in favour.
The ratio operating costs / revenues amount to 39% for London (in 2008; falling from initially 65%), 28% for 
Stockholm and over 100% for Milan’s Ecopass scheme (65%, increasing from initially 46%, for Milan’s Area C 
scheme).
Cost benefits analysis, not analyzed in this paper (see among others OECD, 2010; Danielis, Rotaris, Marcucci, 
Massiani, 2012), report high surplus benefits due to the reduction of externalities generated by traffic.
In all cases a robust increase of public transportation was announced and implemented in coincidence with the 
introduction of the charge and a substantial part of revenues are invested for sustainable mobility (in Stockholm 
indirectly through an agreement with national governments).
In all cases the following trend effects, though in different measures, are demonstrated: traffic reduction and modal 
shift, mainly through increase of passengers of public transport. A relevant pollution emission reduction happened in 
the three cities. An accident reduction was also experienced in Milan and at a minor level in London. 
It is notable that the level of congestion on roads bounding the zone also decreased, both in London (TfL, 2004) 
and in Milan (AMAT, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), where data have been assessed.
It is relevant to underline that, in contrast with a common opinion, there was no significant effect on retail and there 
was no effect on property values both in London (TfL, 2005) and Milan (AMAT, Pragma, 2009) where data have 
been assessed.
Data on congestion show different trends, because local governments in some cases decided to use the road space 
freed from cars for other social or sustainable mobility purposes (bike lanes, pedestrian areas, etc.), like it happened 
in London.
All cases show a high deterrent effect of the charge, as measured on travel behaviour changes referred to all traffic 
and in particular to chargeable traffic. In London a £8 charge drove to a 53% reduction of fully chargeable traffic in 
2007. In Milan the effect has been even stronger: after the first year (2008) Ecopass reduced chargeable passenger 
traffic on average by 60,5% and in the last year (2011) by 79,8% and 63,2%, respectively for a € 2 and € 5 charge2.
2 This unexpected difference, leading a lower charge to cause a higher reduction needs to be further investigated. A possible explanation is the 
lower income of drivers of class 4 vehicles, who are less eager to change car.
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3. Evaluation of passenger car travel elasticities to charge in the three cities 
To assess the contribution of a congestion charge to traffic reduction is quite complex3.
First of all a rational traveler should consider the full cost of a trip, or at least all the components of the variable 
costs involved in a trip to take a decision about travelling. At this purpose the cost of a trip includes at least gasoline 
and parking tariffs - not to consider the value of time. So elasticity of traffic (demand) to the whole cost of a trip 
should be measured, where a congestion charge is just one of the components contributing to the cost.
In theory travelers should be indifferent to which component of the whole cost of a trip varies. In this case we 
should expect that the value of elasticity of traffic to the price of a single component, like gasoline, is the same as 
elasticity to any other component, like a congestion charge. There is a vast body of literature on demand elasticity 
with respect to fuel prices, parking fees, public transport fares, costs of accidents and insurance and other costs of 
driving (see for example the literature reviews: Goodwin, 1992; Oum, Walters and Yong, 1992; TRACE, 1998). Fewer 
works deal with tolls and road charges.
Typical values of elasticity of traffic – measured either in number of car trips or in travelled km – to gasoline price 
are between -0,1 and  -0,15 in the short period and between -0,19 and -0,3 in the long period. TfL (2008b) estimates 
National Transport Model Elasticities of car traffic with respect to Fuel Costs (increase of 10%) between 
-0,17 and -0,24.
In reality a congestion charge seems to weight more than the increase in gasoline price or other costs in the 
perception of drivers. We expect elasticity values of traffic to road charges to be more similar to elasticity values of 
traffic to tolls.
In the road toll systems analysed in economic literature, the typical elasticity values range is between -0,20 and 
-0,50 (see Wuestefeld and Regan, 1981; White, 1984; Goodwin, 1992, 2004; Jones and Hervik, 1992; Harvey, 1994; 
Hirschman et al., 1995; Mauchan and Bonsall, 1995; Gifford and Talkington, 1996; Cain et al., 2001; Burris, 2003; 
Matas and Raymond, 2003). In some of the studies elasticity was analysed in the short and the medium-long terms, 
showing evidence of a general trend towards an increase of 20%-50% (Odeck and Bråthen, 2008; Fonti, 2012).
In our specific analysis on elasticity of traffic to urban road charges, some preliminary considerations are due.
It is necessary to define the variable indicating the quantity of traffic Q. Available data for congestion charges can 
regard number of trips, number of entries or crossings the cordon area, travelled kilometers, a congestion index. 
Unfortunately to use one or another is not always equivalent, as in some cases evaluations based on traffic, access to 
the charging area or congestion in the area involve different trends.
In fact after the first period on introduction of a charge, local governments can decide to take advantage of reduced 
congestion to reserve part of the road space to uses in favour of non motorized traffic (pedestrian space, bicycle lanes, 
etc.), so reducing road capacity with a further alteration of original conditions.
More in general the compresence of other policies and measures targeted to traffic reduction can make it difficult 
to distinguish the effects  attributable to congestion charging.
Even the definition of a baseline quantity of traffic Q0 is difficult as it doesn’t exist a “standard day”. Traffic flows 
vary by months and by several specific day conditions (meteorology,  road works, presence of big events, etc.)
Moreover it is almost impossible to isolate the effect of a congestion charge on traffic from other factors. Many 
external factors influence traffic in a period. Among them: economic activity factors (like per capita income, 
population dynamics and employment rate) and behavioral factors (like number of persons per car), infrastructural 
factors (like availability of transit).
Many factors also influence the real  price of a trip (like inflation, price of gasoline and other costs of car use, price 
of public transport, fiscal regulation regarding the deductibility of the charge). Croci, Melandri, Molteni and 
Zadorozhna (2012) build an interesting index measuring the ratio between public and private transportation (including 
cost of gasoline, park price and congestion charge) and find it to be one of the explanatory variables of greenhouse 
gas emissions by urban traffic. 
3 Even the apparently simple measure of the deterrent effect of a congestion charge (its ability to reduce traffic) is not so easy to perform. One 
could hypotize to calculate it assessing the difference in trends of traffic in the charged area against the non charged area (to be considered as 
characterized by a Business As Usual trend), but this wouldn’t be correct as congestion charging contributes to reduce traffic also in external areas. 
The deterrent effect of a congestion charge scheme also depends on exemptions and discounts, penalties and other specific rules. So the effect on 
total traffic can be very different from the effect on chargeable traffic.
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Most factors don’t have a relevant influence in the short term, while their influence grows in the long term. So it is 
possible to measure a short term and a long term elasticity with a different degree of accuracy4.
The elasticity formulas introduced anyway provide a rough measure, as it attributes the whole impact of traffic 
variation to the introduction or the variation of the charge
A more accurate measure of elasticity requires to consider all the factors incident on traffic variation in the period 
between time 0 and time 1, to describe a model where traffic (Q) is a dependent variable and considered factors –
among which the congestion charge - are independent variables and to measure the influence of each variable on 
traffic variation. This requires the availability of time series of traffic and considered independent variable.
Even if some of these factors have been included in previous econometric analysis, a comprehensive framework is 
still lacking.
In this paper only a comparison of rough measurements of elasticities will be provided, with the risk of overestimate 
their values.
Note that, in coherence with the different indicators and goals of the systems, by traffic reduction we intend 
reduction of number of charged trips in London and Stockholm, while we intend reduction of number of charged 
vehicles in Milan (equivalent to number of charged trips as the average number of entries for vehicle is constant). In 
London both trips across the area and inside the area are included,  in Stockholm all trips crossing the cordon 
(in entrance or in exit) are included and in Milan only trips in entrance to the area are included.
Lack of data and different methodologies in monitoring and evaluating data limit our analysis. Nevertheless it is 
possible to make a comparison of passenger cars elasticities to charge in the three cities. Elasticity is here considered 
with reference to chargeable trips (not to all vehicles). The introduction of the charge can actually affect also non 
chargeable trips, because of better alternatives in public transport and alternative mobility and imitation of virtuous 
behaviours. Elasticity here is considered only for passenger cars. We expect lower elasticity values for commercial 
vehicles which are less sensitive to the charge, as put in evidence in various analysis.
Variations in system rules and contribution of external factors are not completely taken into account, leading to 
a low accuracy of estimates. Still results are relevant and coherent with similar studies.
For London, Transport for London (2008) estimates an elasticity of -0,47. For Stockholm, Börjesson et al. (2012) 
provide an estimation of elasticity from -0,70 in 2006 to -0,85 in 2009 onwards. For Milan, our own measures (Croci, 
Ravazzi, 2015) indicate an elasticity referred to the Ecopass system varying between -0,46 and  -0,66 (for different 
classes of emissions of vehicles). In all cases there is no evidence of a decrease of elasticity over time.
These values are systematically higher than elasticity to fuel price and even to traditional tolls for roads and bridges.
4. Conclusions
The three largest European urban road pricing systems started during a decade (first London in 2003, then 
Stockholm in 2006, finally Milan in 2008). Since their launch, the schemes have been adjusted in terms of amount of 
charge, area of application and other features. Each of them has its own specificities. Nonetheless, the three systems 
can be compared, since they are all cordon pricing based schemes applied to central city areas during working days. 
They also share other features such as the similar technologies in place (i.e. cameras automatically recognizing car 
plates).
Even though each system sets and applies a charge in a different way, they all share the same aim, which is inducing 
travel behavior change by increasing the car trip cost in comparison with other travel modes. 
The three schemes show a high deterrent effect of the charge, as measured on travel behavior changes referred to 
all traffic and in particular to chargeable traffic.The schemes have been able to reduce negative externalities generated 
by traffic, such as accidents, congestion and emissions, up to different levels and to generate modal shift towards 
public transport.
4 “There are two reasons why the long-term effects might be smaller than the short-term effects. First, there might be a “acclimatization” effect: 
after a while, people might get used to the charge and consider it less important when making their travel choices. This effect could be especially 
important if it is, at first, a little difficult to pay the charge – and the extra “cost” of actually making the payment might decrease over time. Second, 
the freed-up road space may induce new traffic – travellers with high values of time, or travellers making car trips not crossing the cordon. There 
are also a number of reasons why the long-term effects might be larger than the short-term effects. There are more possibilities to adjust travel 
behaviour in the long run. Over time, people continually reorganize their lives, relocate place of residence or work, become familiar with new 
destinations or change other habits, and in this process they will take the permanent charges into account.” (Börjesson et al., 2012)
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The demand elasticities of car travel in response to a congestion charge are considerably higher than the values in 
response to fuel costs in literature and even to traditional tolls for roads and bridges, so demonstrating its effectiveness.
A few main policy indications can be drawn from the comparison of the schemes, which can be useful for the 
design of cordon pricing schemes: 
- the charge must be designed in a clear way, so that car drivers perceive the increased car trip cost. In cordon 
pricing, the cost increase is more visible than in other policy measures (e.g. vehicle property tax increases) 
since it regards each single trip; 
- the charge must be high enough to induce travel behaviour change. The present paper doesn’t evaluate which 
factors influence the effective level of the charge, which should be further investigated;
- the launch of a congestion charge must be coupled with an increase in public transport supply, in order to 
provide a credible alternative to private cars;
- the system should be adapted and updated over time based on achieved results. In Milan for example, the 
system shifted from a pollution to a congestion charge because most polluting vehicles were rapidly put out of 
circulation. In London, after a first phase, congestion increased because it was decided to use the road space
freed from cars for other social or sustainable mobility purposes (bike lanes, pedestrian areas, etc.). therefore 
the charge was increased in order to keep its effectiveness;
- Results and benefits of the schemes (e.g. reduced congestion, avoided emissions) must be monitored and 
communicated to citizens. This is necessary to respond to citizens’ concerns, including for example potential 
traffic increase in areas nearby the cordon or impacts on retail. 
Therefore paper results can be useful to design well targeted congestion charge schemes and to assess their efficacy.
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